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Abstract
When adult children expect that their parents will bequeath residential property to
them, they may show their appreciation by providing their parents with nancial support.
This paper theoretically and empirically examines this possibility. We adopt a simple
noncooperative game framework with a Stackelberg equilibrium to examine the recipro-
cal interdependence between the propensity of housing inheritance and nancial assistance
when formal care a¤ects decision-making. We use data from Japanese households to test
this interaction. After considering both the censoring of nancial transfers and the speci-
cation of inheritance propensity, which we control for using information on formal care, our
empirical results suggest that the propensity to inherit the parental home has a signicantly
positive impact on the amount of transfers from children to their parents. Consequently,
an implicit annuity contract in the form of an intrafamily reverse mortgage appears to exist
in Japanese society. However, parents should ensure they convey to their children a high
expectation of future housing inheritance to extract su¢ cient nancial assistance for their
current consumption needs.
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1 Introduction
There has been growing pressure worldwide to cut expenditure on medical benets and insur-
ance payments for the elderly in aging societies. The elderly therefore increasingly expect to
use their accumulated assets for welfare needs rather than relying as heavily on governmental
transfers (Toussaint and Elsinga, 2009; Doling and Ronald, 2010). In turn, housing can play
an important role in addressing this issue because it is the primary asset held by most elderly
households, so nancial instruments such as reverse mortgages may allow elderly homeowners
to remain in their own home and provide a supplemental income until death. In this manner,
a reverse mortgage functions like an annuity. However, reverse mortgages are still quite un-
common because of their potentially high cost, small amount of potential proceeds, and the
limited product knowledge of the elderly (Davido¤ et al., 2017; Moulton et al., 2017). As an
alternative, in some countries, elderly homeowners tend to leave residential property as a future
bequest to derive current nancial provision from their adult children (see, e.g., Toussaint and
Elsinga, 2009 on Europe; Ronald and Doling, 2012 on East Asia).1 The purpose of this paper
is to examine this reciprocal interdependence: whether the anticipation of parental housing
inheritance a¤ects the nancial assistance behavior of adult children.
Our paper is thus associated with testing a bequest motive related to an implicit annuity
contract (Kotliko¤ and Spivak, 1981). According to theory, the elderly choose to insure against
the longevity risk by creating an implicit annuity contract with their children, whereby parents
receive an annuity from their children while they live in exchange for a future bequest. Horioka
(2002) suggested that one variant of this type of contract is an intrafamily reverse mortgage,
whereby children agree to support their parents nancially in exchange for inheriting the
parental home (Farnham and Sevak, 2016). Children may also provide nonmonetary assistance
rather than monetary support, especially in advanced countries. Indeed, the literature has
accumulated evidence for a strategic bequest (exchange) motive by examining whether adult
children provide in-kind transfers to their parents in return for receiving bequests (inter vivos
1 In some cases, the elderly are more likely to leave their home because inheritance taxes give preferential
treatment to real estate assets. This paper, however, is not concerned with tax issues.
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gifts).
For instance, Bernheim et al. (1985) found that childrens attention to their parents,
as measured by visits and phone calls, is positively a¤ected by parental bequests. Norton
and Van Houtven (2006) revealed that children who provide informal care appear to receive
larger inter vivos transfers, while Fu (2019) showed that inter vivos transfers are dependent on
childrens current residential proximity, which may facilitate future informal care. Ciani and
Deiana (2018) suggested that past downstream housing transfers, such as a real estate donation
or down payment, tend to increase current informal elderly care. Tomassini et al. (2003)
and Yamada (2006) indicated that past parental housing assistance has e¤ects on current
childrens geographic proximity. Yin (2010) and Horioka et al. (2018) demonstrated that
bequest expectations encourage intergenerational co-residence, while Yamada (2006) reported
that children who expect to inherit a parental home in the future are more likely to co-reside
with their parents. Turning to studies of upstream monetary support, Ohtake (1991) showed
that nancial transfers provided by children tend to increase when parents possess a large
amount of inheritable assets, where nancial and real estate assets are considered separately.
The amount of housing assets, however, may not always be positively correlated with housing
inheritance.2 Therefore, to our knowledge, little is known about implicit annuity contracts in
the form of intrafamily reverse mortgages. The main contribution of this paper is testing for
the existence of such contracts.
A Stackelberg model of reciprocal interdependence leads to an empirical model where -
nancial assistance is a function of the probability of housing inheritance, which depends on
the cost of formal care. That is, the cost of formal care is assumed to inuence the bequest
behavior of elderly parents. Our theory suggests that the probability of housing inheritance en-
courages upstream nancial support. To test this hypothesis, we used microdata on Japanese
households. Such evidence may provide particularly interesting insights because Japan is very
close to the situation described in the beginning of this paper. Japan is at the forefront of
2Begley (2017), while providing empirical evidence that an increase in housing wealth, driven by unanticipated
shocks to house prices, exerts a positive e¤ect on the probability of elderly homeowners leaving a bequest, did
not focus in particular on the probability of bequesting residential property.
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population aging. Expenditure on social security is at a record level, with 70 percent of all
social security expenditure being on the elderly in the form of public pensions and medical
benets. At the same time, approximately 90 percent of the Japanese elderly aged 65 years or
over own residential property, and this accounts for 60 percent of their total wealth.3 Using the
value of residential real estate holdings of the Japanese elderly, Suzuki (2007) calculated that
an 810,000 yen annual annuity could be potentially obtained through reverse mortgages per
household.4 This would more than cover the di¤erence between average yearly consumption
expenditure and income of approximately 432,000 yen for a nonworking elderly single-person
household and 660,000 yen for a nonworking elderly couple household.5
Nonetheless, it is quite di¢ cult for elderly homeowners to release cash from housing assets
because the nancial sector does not readily provide reverse mortgage loans against property
(Kojima, 2013).6 In general, Japanese reverse mortgage loans are recourse loans. Therefore,
both the collateral and other assets can be seized by lenders when borrowers default on their
loan. Additionally, income support cannot be guaranteed for life; therefore, the support may
end even while borrowers are living, and repayment may be required during the loan term when
the assessed value falls because of falling land prices.7 On this basis, institutional innovations
in Japan appear to lag far behind those in most Western countries (Mitchell and Piggott, 2004).
Under these circumstances, the elderly may instead leave their housing assets to children to
3According to the 2014 National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (Table 69. Estimated value of
assets per household by age group of household head), 88.2 percent of households whose household head is 65
years or older own their own home. In terms of net (gross) value, their total assets are valued at 44,196,000
(66,746,000) yen, while their total housing and land assets are valued at 25,924,000 (45,231,000) yen.
4Simulations by Green and Zhu (2018) suggested that converting home equity into annuity income rather
than a lump sum tends to increase the feasibility of reverse mortgages in Japan under circumstances such as
decreasing land prices and increasing life expectancy.
5Summary Results of the 2016 Family Income and Expenditure Survey reported that the disposable income
of no-occupation one-person households with a household head aged 60 years or older is 107,648 yen per month,
while their monthly consumption expenditure is 143,959 yen. They, thus, need an additional 36,311 yen per
month to cover their living costs. For no-occupation aged-couple households, composed of a husband aged 65
years or older and a wife aged 60 years or older, the monthly disposable income is 180,958 yen, while their
monthly consumption expenditure is 235,477 yen. Therefore, the shortfall is approximately 54,519 yen.
6 In his analysis, Suzuki (2007) considered various restrictions on contracting reverse mortgages.
7The 2016 Japan Household Panel Survey (JHPS) asked respondents (N = 4; 993) to report their intention to
use a reverse mortgage based on the following question: How likely is it that you will use a reverse mortgage?
1 = have used; 2 = very likely; 3 = likely; 4 = unlikely; 5 = very unlikely; 6 = do not know. On average, about
1.4 and 10.3 percent of respondents selected the second or third response, respectively, but less than 0.1 percent
selected the rst response.
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draw monetary support while living. Similarly to other Asian societies, it is quite common in
Japan for adult children to support their elderly parents, and inherit their parentsproperty
assets (Ronald and Doling, 2012). This is becoming increasingly common because the low
fertility rate in Japan implies fewer siblings (Hirayama, 2010).
Two considerations are examined empirically. First, a specication issue may exist associ-
ated with the expectation of housing inheritance, which arises from the potential for measure-
ment error inherent in a discrete dichotomous response to a question about housing inheritance
expectation and the specication of a dummy variable (Yamada, 2006). Some respondents may
be confused by having to select one of two polar responses: they might have to respond with
0 even if they have a low positive propensity to inherit, while others might have to respond
with 1 even if they do not expect a 100 percent probability of inheritance. To address this, we
specify proxy variables for formal care that appear to a¤ect the bequest behavior of parents,
and employ a probit model in our estimation. In fact, our empirical results indicate that the
probability of housing inheritance is signicantly a¤ected by one of these formal care variables.
The probit model is ideal for understanding how elderly parents respond to incentives. Second,
we must also account for the censoring of transfers from adult children to aging parents be-
cause our transfer observations are limited to values greater than or equal to zero. To examine
this, we estimate a Tobit model, which can consider the intensive margin of upstream nancial
support (Cox, 1987). In light of both issues, our empirical results demonstrate that the expec-
tation of inheriting housing wealth in the future has a signicantly positive e¤ect on current
support payments. This suggests that an implicit annuity contract is a motive to consider
regarding the reciprocal interdependence between housing inheritance and nancial assistance.
However, our empirical results also indicate that upstream nancial transfers appear to be too
small to cover the consumption needs of aging parents. To correct this, parents should provide
their children with a substantially high expectation of inheriting the parental home.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a theoretical
model of reciprocal interdependence between housing inheritance and nancial assistance. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the data and empirical model used, along with the empirical results. Section
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4 summarizes the main ndings of the paper.
2 Model
The purpose of this section is to construct a simple theoretical model that considers the ob-
servable characteristics in our empirical study. The theory adopted within the model leads to
testable hypotheses and informs the empirical analysis. There are two players in the model: a
parent and a child. The parent is assumed to be imperfectly altruistic: the parent cares for the
utility of the child, but the parent also cares about monetary transfers t that the child may pro-
vide. In contrast, the child is assumed to be nonaltruistic. The following two-stage framework
is adopted: the parent rst decides the propensity  to leave their own house valued at h as an
inheritance to the child, and an amount of formal care m in the market. If the parent plans to
bequest the house, then  = 1, whereas if the parent does not, then  = 0. Because we treat 
as the propensity, which is reasonable for parents who will choose an interior solution,  ranges
from zero to one. This also allows us to di¤erentiate the transfer function, as shown later. The
child then decides consumption c and the size of transfers t, expecting to consume inherited
housing h. Our model applies a simple noncooperative game framework with a Stackelberg
equilibrium that can examine a reciprocal interdependence between t and . As discussed in
Section 1, one reason why housing is left by the parent is the bequest motive arising from the
implicit annuity contract: the parent receives nancial assistance from the child upon leaving
the child the home.
Assume that the (expected) utility function of the child is u(c)+, where h is normalized to
one because we cannot observe it from the data, and uc > 0 and ucc < 0, where the subscripts
indicate the rst and second derivatives. The child will inherit the parental home whenever
the utility obtained is not less than the reservation utility u that the child obtains from not
inheriting the home.
u(c) +   u (1)
The budget constraint of the child becomes:
y   t = c; (2)
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where y is the income of the child.
The rational parent ensures that the child receives the reservation utility in order to be
willing to supply nancial support. Hereafter, we only consider the case where Eq. (1) is
binding. Substituting the budget constraint Eq. (2) into the utility function Eq. (1) yields
u(y t)+ = u. The amount of transfers must satisfy this relationship. The transfers function
then becomes:
t = t(; y; u): (3)
Conversely, the child refuses the inheritance and chooses t = 0 when Eq. (1) does not hold.
The primary variable of interest is . Di¤erentiating the transfer function with respect to a
given value of , we obtain: @t=@ > 0. The positive sign indicates that the child can increase
monetary support instead of reducing consumption expenditure if the parent is more willing
to leave their own home because housing inheritance substitutes for consumption.
We now consider parental behavior. Assume that the private utility function of the parent
depends on t and m. That is, nancial transfers from the child to the parent directly gratify
the parents utility. For example, assisting the parent with money can be regarded as a form
of child attention, so receiving money from ones own children appears to di¤er from receiving
wages or pensions. Because the income of the parent is not observed from the data, private
utility is assumed to be quasilinear: v(t) +m, where vt > 0 and vtt < 0. The imperfectly
altruistic parents utility function can be assumed to be:
v(t) +m+ u(c) + : (4)
The parent uses both the housing asset and nancial transfers to purchasem. As mentioned,
it is di¢ cult for elderly homeowners to release part of their housing wealth as cash through the
nancial sector, particularly in Japan. For simplicity, however, we neglect this issue. Namely,
the parent can theoretically convert the housing asset into cash. Note that the value of housing
is normalized to one and the parent holds the housing asset with propensity (1 ). The budget
constraint of the parent is then:
(1  ) + t = pm; (5)
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where p is the price of care services.
The parent maximizes Eq. (4) subject to the following four constraints: the childs budget
constraint Eq. (2), the transfer function Eq. (3), the parents budget constraint Eq. (5), and
0   ( 1).
Substituting Eqs. (2), (3), and (5) into the utility function Eq. (4) yields the result that
the choice variables are reduced to only one variable: . Suppose the second-order condition of
a maximum and @t=@ < 1. The latter assumption implies that the increment of nancial help
is less than the value of housing, which is normalized to one. Then, the optimal propensity of
inheritance satises:
vt
@t
@
+
1
p

@t
@
  1

 0: (6)
The optimal value of  is zero when Eq. (6) holds with inequality, while it is positive when
Eq. (6) holds with equality. The inheritance propensity function then becomes:
 = (p; y; u): (7)
Eqs. (6) and (7) imply that the cost of formal care a¤ects the bequeathing behavior of
elderly homeowners. Under our assumptions, the partial derivative of the price of care services
p is positive: @=@p > 0. Because care services are assumed to be a substitute for the childs
support, the parent is more willing to leave their own home to the child when the price of care
services rises.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Empirical model
Our data, which are introduced later, are based on a survey of childrens households i. We
consider the following linear form of the nancial transfer function:
ti = Ci +XiC + "Ci; (8)
where ti is an observed value measuring the transfer paid, i is the probability of inheriting
the parental home, which is the primary variable of interest, Xi is a vector of explanatory
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variables, C and C are coe¢ cients, and "Ci is an error term. Theory suggests that the sign
of C is likely to be positive. Explanatory variables include household income (yi), which is
presented in Eq. (3). We also control for reservation utility u using household characteristics,
region-specic e¤ects (using regional dummy variables), and time-specic e¤ects (using year
dummy variables). Eq. (8) may still include unobserved heterogeneity. Panel data allow
us to estimate a xed e¤ects model, in which we can remove the unobserved e¤ect prior to
estimation. We, however, apply pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) in the empirical stage,
because we focus on dummy variables related to siblings of adult children, which are generally
constant over time.8
We must account for the fact that optimizing behavior leads to a corner solution response
for some signicant portion of adult children. That is, observations of monetary support are
limited to values greater than or equal to zero. Suppose that children with low chances of
inheriting tend to receive monetary transfers from parents rather than give to them. Then, the
C coe¢ cient estimated in Eq. (8) is likely to be biased downward because of the censoring.
To address this, we replace ti in Eq. (8) as an unobserved latent variable t
#
i , and estimate a
Tobit model. Namely, we estimate the upstream nancial transfers on the intensive margin as
in Cox (1987). The nonnegative value ti is dened as follows:
ti = t
#
i ; if t
#
i > 0
= 0; otherwise.
Unfortunately, we cannot observe the probability of housing inheritance i. Instead, we can
observe a dummy variable di measuring whether households have a probability of inheriting
the parental home from the dichotomous response to the question. Yamada (2006) also cau-
tioned that the measurement error of the dummy variable for future inheritance expectations
may cause attenuation bias, although he did not examine this issue in his empirical analysis.
To correct this specication, we obtain a predicted value of the inheritance propensity as a
generated regressor from the following linear form of the inheritance propensity function using
8The xed e¤ects model does not fundamentally change our main results (results not shown).
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the probit model:
#i = P pi +XiP + "Pi; (9)
where #i is an unobserved latent variable measuring the inheritance propensity, pi is the price
of formal care, P and P are coe¢ cients, and "Pi is the error term. The latent variable
determines the outcome observed for the zeroone dummy di as follows:
di = 1; if 
#
i > 0
= 0; otherwise.
We then replace i in Eq. (8) as the probability based on the generated regressor ^
#
i , and
estimate a second-stage Tobit model. Consistent with the theoretical analysis, this procedure
allows the generated regressor of inheritance propensity in Eq. (8) to become a continuous
variable ranging from zero to one. Given that the probabilities of inheritance calculated in the
rst-stage probit estimation provide the generated regressor, we use bootstrap standard errors
for signicance tests of each coe¢ cient in the second-stage Tobit estimation.
Yamada (2006) assumed that future downstream housing transfers may be exogenous in his
empirical analysis. Eq. (8), however, is a structural form model. The C estimated coe¢ cient
is likely biased because of the endogeneity of i, which arises from the possibility of omitted
variables. For example, unobservable characteristics of the value of the parental home may
have an impact on the bequest behavior of parents (Begley, 2017). The variables also have a
tendency to impact on the transfer decisions of children. Our empirical model, however, can
consider not only the specication of i but also the endogeneity of i. Estimating Eq. (9)
is useful, because we can interpret how the housing transfer decisions of elderly parents are
altered by incentives.
3.2 Data
Our empirical analysis draws on the Japan Household Panel Survey (JHPS) to examine the
relationship between heritability and the monetary transfer decisions of adult children. The
JHPS, sponsored by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), is a nationally
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representative and large-scale survey of Japanese households. The JHPS comprises two sets
of population surveys: one commenced in 2004 (originally called the Keio Household Panel
Survey, KHPS) and the other in 2009 (the initial JHPS sample), both of which had an initial
sample of approximately 4,000 households.9 The KHPS was integrated into the current JHPS
in 2014. In the following analysis, we use the 12 years of the JHPS from 2005 to 2016.
The JHPS is particularly suited to addressing the research questions in this paper because it
contains detailed information on housing inheritance, nancial support, and includes a rich set
of family background characteristics. In our analysis, we use the questionnaire completed from
the perspective of the adult child. The JHPS asks these respondents to report the total amount
of nancial assistance to their parents in the last year if their parents were alive (i.e., how
much nancial assistance did you give to your parents last year?). The possibility of inheriting
the parental home in the future is evaluated using a dichotomous question on inheritance (i.e.,
is there a possibility that you will inherit the parents home in the future?). We therefore
obtain a binary variable indicating whether adult children believe they will inherit the parental
home in the future.
The housing assets of the Japanese elderly generally go to their eldest male child because
patriarchy has traditionally been a common practice in Japanese society (Izuhara, 2010). Filial
piety, where adult children have an obligation to look after and support their aging parents,
also appears to be considered a virtue in Japanese society (Taniguchi and Kaufman, 2017).
Housing asset transmission and intergenerational nancial assistance then potentially have a
positive correlation in Japan given existing social norms. To control for this e¤ect, we specify
a dummy variable for the respondent being the eldest son. Under patriarchy, primogeniture,
whereby the rstborn son inherits the parental home, is considered as an appropriate form of
inheritance. We also include a binary variable indicating whether a respondent has no siblings
(an only child). If Japanese seniors are considering succession, an only child is then more likely
to inherit the family home. In addition to these variables, we gather data on a number of
important economic and demographic characteristics of adult children from the JHPS. These
9 In addition, there were random refreshment samples of approximately 1,400 and 1,000 new respondents in
2007 and 2012, respectively.
11
include the age of the householder, household income, employment status, and the number of
households. Childs income is measured by the total annual income of all household members.
Nonworker is a binary variable indicating that a householder is not employed. The dummy
variables for region, city size, and the survey year serve as controls in all of our estimations.
The JHPS categorizes a respondents location of residence across seven regions (Hokkaido,
Tohoku, Kanto, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku/Shikoku, and Kyushu) and three city sizes (20 major
cities, other smaller cities, and towns/villages). All monetary variables are converted to 2005
prices using the consumer price index.
The price of formal care in the vicinity will inuence aging parent behavior. In this paper,
we consider the long-term care (LTC) services provided by the market. However, we cannot
obtain a market price for LTC because it is government controlled. Instead, we use the capacity
of LTC institutions in each prefecture, which is obtained from the Survey of Institutions and
Establishments for Long-term Care (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). Izuhara (2006)
noted that LTC institutions are unevenly distributed across the country, which results in
a shortage of such institutions in some regions. Therefore, LTC institutions may provide
su¢ cient variation in the data. To construct this variable, we divide the number of hospital
beds, which reects the supply side of institutional care, by the elderly population, which
reects the demand side. LTC capacity thus likely proxies the accessibility of formal care.
Contrary to the expected sign of the price of formal care, the expected sign of LTC capacity is
negative. In addition to LTC capacity, we consider professional care services for the home in
each prefecture, data for which are also obtained from the above survey, and specify a home
helper variable that equals the number of home helpers divided by the elderly population.
The number of observations is 63,097. The JHPS asks respondents to answer whether their
parents are alive or not. As we examine nancial transfers from adult children to living parents
in our empirical analysis, we remove respondents whose parents passed away from this question,
resulting in 35,298 observations. In addition, we remove respondents with a missing value for
upstream transfers, resulting in 33,494 remaining observations. We also focus on respondents
who respond to the question concerning the propensity to inherit the parental home, resulting
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in 33,094 observations. Unfortunately, we cannot obtain the parentsresidential location from
the data prior to 2016. However, the JHPS asks respondents about the residential proximity to
their parents or parents-in-law (respondents are asked to respond about whichever of these live
closest to them). From this question, we can observe whether respondents and their parents
reside in the same region. As data for LTC capacity and home helpers are only observed at
the prefecture level, we restrict the sample to only those respondents whose parents reside
in the same prefecture. However, because we cannot obtain data on the parentsresidential
location when the closest living parents are not parents of the respondent but the parents of
their spouse, this reduced the number of observations to 11,671. We thus supplement our data
with information on parentsresidential location using the 2016 JHPS. From this question, we
can use observations of respondents whose parents have resided in the same prefecture since
2016. We also add observations by assuming that these same parents have remained in the
same prefecture since before 2016. This assumption is somewhat valid because Japan is known
as a low-residential-mobility society (Seko and Sumita, 2007). This increased the sample by
9,564 observations; consequently, there are now 21,235 observations. Finally, restricting the
sample to those where all necessary information was available, our estimation is based on a
total of 14,204 observations.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our variables. On average, the annual nancial
support from adult children to their parents is approximately 81,700 yen, equivalent to about
$742.7 ($1 = 110 yen). About one in seven respondents provide positive transfers to their
parents. However, approximately half of all respondents expect to inherit the parental home.
This disparity suggests that not all parents receive nancial support from their children in
exchange for leaving them the family home.
Table 2 presents the di¤erence in summary statistics for annual nancial transfers between
respondents who expect to inherit the parental home and those who do not. On average, adult
children who expect to inherit the parental home provide a larger amount of nancial support
than those who do not. The proportion of adult children who provide a positive transfer to
parents is also higher for children who expect to inherit the parental home than for those who
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do not.
3.3 Estimation results
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the rst-stage probit model, which are used to obtain
the predicted value of inheritance propensity as the generated regressor. The coe¢ cient of
eldest son has a positive and signicant sign. This indicates that the eldest son tends to plan
to inherit the parental home, and this seems to correspond with the longstanding practice of
primogeniture in Japan (Horioka, 2002; Ishino et al., 2017). As expected, respondents who are
an only child are more likely to inherit the family home than their counterparts with siblings.
The estimated coe¢ cient of income is signicantly positive, which is inconsistent with parents
behaving in an altruistic way; that is, adult children with low incomes tend to inherit the
parental home. The coe¢ cient of household size has a positive sign and is signicant, indicating
that children are more likely to receive the parental home when they have a large family. As
expected, the coe¢ cient of home helper has a negative and signicant sign, indicating that
children are less likely to inherit the parental home when access to professional care services
by seniors increases. In contrast, the coe¢ cient of LTC capacity has an unexpected sign and
is statistically insignicant.
Figure 1 represents the kernel densities of the predicted value of the inheritance propensity
with and without heritability, which we obtain from the rst-stage probit model. Figure 1
indeed demonstrates that children with heritability are more likely to inherit the parental
home.
Table 4 provides the OLS and Tobit estimation results for monetary support from children
to parents. In the second-stage OLS estimation in Table 4, the coe¢ cient of the generated re-
gressor measuring the propensity of inheriting the parental home has a positive and signicant
sign. This appears to conrm the hypothesis of an implicit annuity contract in the form of
an intrafamily reverse mortgage between adult children and their parents. However, while the
second-stage OLS estimation in Table 4 considers the specication issue of inheritance propen-
sity, it does not control for the censoring of nancial transfers. The second-stage Tobit model
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in Table 4 considers both concerns. Again, the inheritance probabilities have a signicantly
positive e¤ect on nancial assistance from children to parents, which is consistent with our
expectation. The coe¢ cient of housing inheritance in the Tobit model is larger in magnitude
than in the OLS estimation, as expected. From the estimated results of the Tobit model in
Table 4, we can compute a marginal e¤ect of housing inheritance probabilities on nancial
assistance by setting the values of all covariates to their means. The marginal e¤ect is 86.55
and its bootstrap standard error is 38.63.
In terms of the other explanatory variables, the Tobit model in Table 4 shows as follows.
The coe¢ cients indicating the eldest son and an only child have negative and signicant signs.
These results seem somewhat inconsistent with social norms. One possible interpretation is
that these children are more likely to give their parents nonmonetary rather than monetary
assistance. Household size also has a negative and signicant sign. This indicates that children
cannot a¤ord the expense of supporting their parents when they themselves have a large family
to support.
Figure 2 plots the kernel densities of the predicted value of housing inheritance obtained
from the rst-stage probit model in Table 3 using all observations. Figure 2 also depicts the
relationship between the inheritance propensity and nancial assistance from the second-stage
Tobit model in Table 4. The average predicted value of inheritance propensity is approximately
47.6 percent and at this propensity the predicted value of nancial assistance is 141,800 yen
per year, which is 60,100 yen higher than the average value in Table 2. As mentioned in
Section 1, however, nonworking elderly single-person households and nonworking elderly couple
households respectively su¤er a decit in income of approximately 432,000 yen and 660,000
yen per year. The predicted value of nancial assistance in the above average case is far below
these values. Despite the fact that the number of children who can provide 432,000 or 660,000
yen per year to their parents is small, above the 89.8 or 96.4 percentile of the distribution,
children are likely to do so when the predicted value of the inheritance propensity is 65.4 or 73.6
percent. Suzuki (2007) predicted that the elderly could extract 810,000 yen per year if they
used formal reverse mortgages. Aging parents can receive this same value using intrafamily
15
reverse mortgages when they grant their children a 78.0 percent housing inheritance probability.
This is despite the number of adult children who could provide 810,000 yen per year to their
parents being much smaller, above the 98.3 percentile of the distribution. In sum, intrafamily
reverse mortgages appear to serve as substitutes for formal reverse mortgages if parents give
their children a substantially high expectation of inheriting the parental home.
We also check whether nancial assistance varies among subgroups according to childs
income: household incomes below the 25th percentile (low-income child) and those at or above
the 25th percentile (high-income child). Table 5 demonstrates that adult children in the high-
income group signicantly increase their transfers when they expect to receive the parental
home. Combined with the results from the rst-stage probit model in Table 3, we can observe
a strong interdependence between parents and their wealthy children. However, the coe¢ cient
of housing inheritance is insignicant for children from the low-income group. This may reect
the fact that children with limited resources are more likely to give parents nonmonetary
assistance when they cannot a¤ord to o¤er monetary support (Taniguchi and Kaufman, 2017).
Alternatively, some elderly parents are purely altruistic, therefore, they bequest housing assets
without an expectation of receiving nancial help while they are alive from their low-income
children.
3.4 Robustness checks
The remainder of this section reports the results of addtional specications to assess the ro-
bustness of our main ndings. In Table 6, we show the empirical results of the OLS and Tobit
models with a zeroone dummy for inheritance propensity, to see how the models in Table 4
modify possible bias. However, it is not easy to compare the magnitude of the coe¢ cients,
because the generated regressor of inheritance propensity in Table 4 is a continuous variable
ranging from zero to one, while inheritance propensity in Table 6 is a dummy variable taking
on the values of zero or one. The results show that the estimated coe¢ cients for this dummy
variable are positive and signicant in both models, which yield results that are qualitatively
similar to those in Table 4.
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Table 7 presents the empirical results of the instrumental variable (IV) regression and
the IV Tobit model. We again nd that the estimated coe¢ cients of the dummy variable
instrumented by the generated instruments indicating that adult children expect to receive the
parental home are positive and signicant. The test statistics of endogeneity are su¢ ciently
large in both models, indicating rejection of the null hypothesis that inheritance propensity is
an exogenous variable at conventional signicance levels.
Instead of ti, we can consider an observed dummy variable measuring whether adult children
give nancial transfers tdi . Then, the latent variable t
#
i is estimated by a probit model, which
estimates the upstream transfers on the extensive margins (Cox, 1987). The zeroone dummy
tdi is dened as follows:
tdi = 1; if t
#
i > 0
= 0; otherwise.
Model [1] in Table 8 demonstrates the empirical results of the second-stage probit model.
The coe¢ cient of housing inheritance suggests that children are statistically more likely to
give nancial transfers when they expect to receive the parental home, which is consistent
with our expectation. The estimated marginal e¤ect is 0.87 and its bootstrap standard error
is 0.45. Models [2] and [3] in Table 8 show the empirical results of the probit and the second-
stage IV probit models with a zeroone dummy for inheritance propensity. Both models also
correspond with our expectation, because the coe¢ cients of housing inheritance dummy have
a signicantly positive sign. Overall, the results in Tables 6, 7, and 8 provide some condence
that our preferred ndings are not unduly inuenced by alternative empirical models.
4 Conclusion
In Japan, elderly homeowners generally leave their housing assets to their children. It is also
quite common that adult children demonstrate their appreciation to their aging parents by
providing nancial support while they are alive. This reciprocal interdependence appears to
indicate that adult children and aging parents enter into an implicit annuity contract in the
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form of an informal intrafamily reverse mortgage, whereby children agree to support their
parents nancially in exchange for inheriting the parental home. The purpose of this paper is
to theoretically and empirically examine this possibility.
We applied a simple noncooperative game framework with a Stackelberg equilibrium to
examine the reciprocal interdependence between the propensity of housing inheritance and
nancial assistance when formal care a¤ects decision-making. Theoretical models have sug-
gested that adult children increase the amount of nancial support to their parents when the
probability of housing inheritance increases, which is consistent with a bequest motive arising
from an implicit annuity contract.
We used data from Japanese households to test this reciprocal interdependence. Consider-
ing both the censoring of nancial transfers and the specication of the inheritance propensity,
which are controlled using information on formal care, our empirical results indeed suggest
that the propensity to inherit the parental home encourages transfers from adult children to
their elderly parents. This may conrm that the implicit annuity contract in the form of an
intrafamily reverse mortgage appears to exist in Japanese society. However, altruism may also
be a motive for bequeathing housing assets and engaging in nancial provision. For example,
altruistic children may o¤er nancial assistance when parents run out of funds for living ex-
penses. Parents then tend to show their appreciation to their children by bequeathing housing
wealth. Instead, the bequest motive related to an implicit annuity contract may be an addi-
tional motivator in societies where assets, particularly illiquid housing assets in our context,
are quite di¢ cult to convert into cash.
The estimated results, however, suggest that on average, the amount of nancial transfers
from children tends to be too small to cover the welfare needs of their parents. Intrafamily
reverse mortgages are e¤ectively available to elderly homeowners if children have high expec-
tations of inheriting the parental home. This could be resolved if adult children were to legally
contract with their elderly parents in relation to housing inheritance and nancial assistance.
For example, in the USA, National Family Mortgage, LLC provides a family-funded reverse
mortgage called the Caregiver Mortgage, whereby adult children crowdfund a line of credit
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against the equity in the parental home.
Subsample analysis indicated that the reciprocal interdependence found tends to operate
best for children whose income is relatively high. However, nancial support from children
to parents is small when the income of the children is su¢ ciently low. These children cannot
a¤ord to assist their elderly parents nancially even if they receive the parental home in the
future. Prolonged economic stagnation in Japan has resulted in a decreasing share of adult
children in the higher income class. This suggests that intrafamily reverse mortgages may
be available to even fewer elderly homeowners in the not-too-distant future. Nevertheless,
this could be resolved if the commercial nancial sector promoted customer-friendly reverse
mortgage products to elderly homeowners.
There is, however, a consideration in that waiving inherited housing is becoming more com-
mon in Japan (Hirayama, 2010). Indeed, the number of vacant houses is soaring in unattractive
locations in Japan. Intrafamily reverse mortgages therefore would not be e¤ective in main-
taining the welfare of the elderly in such areas. It is also di¢ cult for the commercial nancial
sector to develop reverse mortgages in locations with little prospect for prot. This situation is
more likely to occur when adult children live a considerable distance away from their parents.
Because we restricted our sample to respondents whose parents reside in the same prefecture,
this issue remains a topic for future research.
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Figure 1: Kernel densities of predicted value of housing inheritance probabilities with and without heritability     
 
Figure 2: Predicted value of housing inheritance probabilities and financial assistance    
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the full sample Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Financial assistance (10,000 yen) 8.17 58.37 0.00 5197.51 Positive assistance (%) 13.57 34.25 0.00 100.00 Housing inheritance (dummy) 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 Eldest son (dummy) 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 Only child (dummy) 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 Age 46.00 10.97 20.00 86.00 Child’s income (10,000 yen) 734.38 485.26 0.00 9771.31 Nonworker (dummy) 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 Household size (#) 3.73 1.39 1.00 10.00 LTC capacity (1,000 beds/100,000 elderly) 2.98 0.65 1.54 5.99 Home helper (1,000 person/100,000 elderly) 1.41 0.51 0.61 2.74 Observations  14,204    Note: Descriptive statistics for region, city size, and survey year dummies not shown.   
Table 2: Annual financial assistance from adult children to parents  With heritability  Without heritability Mean (10,000 yen) 11.67 4.98  (81.25) (22.04) Positive assistance (%) 16.64 10.79 Observations  6,760 7,444 Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.    
Table 3: Estimation results of the first-stage probit model Variables Coef. Robust Std. Err. Eldest son 0.478*** 0.025 Only child 0.452*** 0.050 Age  –0.012*** 0.001 Child’s income  0.021*** 0.003 Nonworker 0.027 0.046 Household size 0.088*** 0.008 LTC capacity 0.023 0.033 Home helper –0.094*** 0.033 Constant  –0.186 0.129 Pseudo R2 0.050  Note: Number of observations is 14,204. Model controls for region, city size, and survey year (estimates not shown). *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
  
Table 4: Estimation results of the second-stage OLS and Tobit models  OLS Tobit Variables Coef. Bootstrap Std. Err. Coef. Bootstrap Std. Err. Housing inheritance 70.650* 40.309 745.531* 303.193 Eldest son –10.491 8.495 –105.806** 63.082 Only child –10.267 7.726 –108.225** 56.222 Age 0.258* 0.146 1.783 1.144 Child’s income 0.059 0.268 –0.715 1.889 Nonworker –1.268 1.950 –2.507 16.604 Household size –3.542*** 1.364 –34.205*** 10.795 Constant –21.037 16.124 –541.079*** 141.986 
R2 0.006    Pseudo R2   0.008  Note: Number of observations is 14,204. Housing inheritance is the generated regressor obtained from the first-stage probit model. Child’s income is divided by 100. Models control for region and survey year (estimates not shown). Bootstrap Std. Err. obtained by bootstrap approximation using 500 resamples. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.   
Table 5: Estimation results of the subsamples according to child's income  High-income child Low-income child Variables Coef. Bootstrap Std. Err. Coef. Bootstrap Std. Err. Housing inheritance 968.678** 400.128 –40.185 300.073 Eldest son –151.055* 82.099 38.966 72.133 Only child –133.046* 72.133 1.646 82.099 Age 2.081 1.499 –0.144 1.086 Child’s income –2.486 2.467 –0.708 4.086 Nonworker 12.022 25.922 –10.457 15.131 Household size –44.345 14.413 –1.081 10.349 Constant –630.499*** 184.615 –128.288 119.606 Pseudo R2 0.009  0.008  Observations 10,655  3,549  Note: Housing inheritance is the generated regressor obtained from the first-stage probit model. Child’s income is divided by 100. Models control for region and survey year (estimates not shown). High-income child is defined as a child whose household income is at or above the 25th percentile. Low-income child is defined as a child whose household income is below the 25th percentile. Bootstrap Std. Err. obtained by bootstrap approximation using 500 resamples. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.    
Table 6: Estimation results of the OLS and Tobit models    OLS Tobit Variables Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. Robust Std. Err. Housing inheritance dummy 6.281*** 1.113 47.282*** 11.788 Eldest son 1.273 1.004 22.196** 6.518 Only child 0.180 2.044 3.986 10.580 Age –0.032 0.028 –1.375*** 0.401 Child’s income 0.545** 0.146 4.572*** 1.232 Nonworker –0.573 1.334 5.148 10.370 Household size –1.352*** 0.514 –10.534*** 3.540 Constant 4.236 2.630 –263.258*** 65.025 
R2 0.008    Pseudo R2   0.010  Note: Number of observations is 14,204. Child’s income is divided by 100. Models control for region and survey year (estimates not shown). ***, ** denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, respectively.   
Table 7: Estimation results of the second-stage IV regression and IV Tobit models  IV regression IV Tobit Variables Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. Robust Std. Err. Housing inheritance dummy 47.444** 20.708 502.358*** 168.732 Eldest son –6.268 4.061 –61.072** 29.522 Only child –6.720 4.873 –71.399** 30.973 Age 0.226 0.234 0.688 0.72 Child’s income 0.154 0.102 1.074 1.347 Nonworker –1.089 1.47 –0.439 12.931 Household size –2.745*** 0.788 –25.987*** 7.766 Constant –11.878 8.921 –442.013*** 111.108 Tests of endogeneity [p-value] 4.566 [0.033] 15.964 [0.001] Note: Number of observations is 14,204. Housing inheritance dummy is the generated IV obtained from the first-stage probit model. Child’s income is divided by 100. Models control for region and survey year (estimates not shown). The null hypothesis that all independent variables including housing inheritance dummy are exogenous in the IV regression model is tested using a Wooldridge (1995) robust regression-based test.  The null hypothesis that housing inheritance dummy is exogenous in the IV Tobit model is tested using the Wald test.  ***, ** denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, respectively.    
Table 8: Estimation results of the probit models  [1] [2] [3]  Variables Probit (2nd stage) Probit IV probit (2nd stage) Housing inheritance  4.105**    (2.008)   Housing inheritance dummy  0.223*** 1.747***   [0.028] [0.172] Eldest son –0.578  0.133***  –0.210***  (0.420) [0.031] [0.057] Only child –0.601 0.024  –0.250***  (0.374) [0.057] [0.058] Age 0.008  –0.009*** 0.001  (0.008) [0.001] [0.002] Child’s income –0.004 0.025*** 0.003  (0.013) [0.003] [0.005] Nonworker 0.003 0.044 0.009  (0.107) [0.059] [0.046] Household size  –0.184***  –0.052***  –0.087***  (0.065) [0.011] [0.008] Constant  –2.784***  –1.251***  –1.420***     (0.845) [0.122] [0.119]  Pseudo R2 0.028 0.032  Tests of endogeneity    18.630    {0.000} Note: Number of observations is 14,204. Housing inheritance in Model [1] is the generated regressor obtained from the first-stage probit model. Housing inheritance dummy in Model [3] is the generated IV obtained from the first-stage probit model. Child’s income is divided by 100. Models control for region and survey year (estimates not shown). The null hypothesis that housing inheritance dummy is exogenous in the IV probit model is tested using the Wald test.  Bootstrap Std. Err. in parentheses, Robust Std. Err. in brackets, p-value in braces.  Bootstrap Std. Err. obtained by bootstrap approximation using 500 resamples. ***, ** denote significance at the 1%, 5% level, respectively.                                      
